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STATE OF

UT~\H,

Plainti.ff and Respondent,
No. 6191

\S .

.AUSTIN WHITELY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF

PLAI~TIFF

AND RESPONDENT

STATEliENT OF FACTS
The appellant in the trial court announced through
his counsel that he desired to waive a jury and try the
cause before the court. The trial court, with the approval
of the District Attorney, consneted to appellant's request
and dismissed the jury.
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To the trial court's conviction of burglary, appellant claims error to this court for the following reasons:
(1) There was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. ( 2) The corpus delecti was not established; and
(3) The trial court erred in holding that the burden of
proof shifted to the defendant when he presented his
alibi.
The first two points are similar, hence will be treated
together.
Appellant's recitation of the facts, and the transcript of the testimony form ample argument and authority to support and uphold the trial court's judgmentA few observations will, we believe, conclusively rest
the judgment of this court with that of the trial court.
A crime of burglary in the second degree was committed in the home of Arthur D. Miller, Farmington,
Utah, about eight o'clock November 31, 1938. This was
admitted by the appellant. (Tr. p. 40). It was also
admitted by him that the person who confronted Deputy
Sheriff Oviatt with a gun about eight p. m. November
20, just north of the intersection of Lagoon Lane and
the old State Highway was the guilty person. ( Tr. p. 6;)).
Hence, all that \vas left for the state to do was to establish the evidence of identity of the person who confronted the sheriff (above mentioned) with that of the apellant.
Reed Oviatt, a Deputy Sheriff, testified that he and
his wife left their home east on Lagoon Lane jw;;t beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fore eight p. m. N oYemlwr :10. 1n:~s; that on nppronehino-0 the interseetion of the hig·hwaY
and Lagoon LanP,
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about three bloeks north of Farmington, Utnh, he noticed the tread marks of the tires of a parked automobile
as being "the kind of tread marks we were looking for."
(Tr. p. 53); that he further exmned the tires and automobile "ith his flash light; that it was a dark blue 1~1:~2
ChevTolet coaeh 1'ith red wire wheels, a fish-pole antenae
on the left side and had screw type general tires; that
he sent his "ife to phone Deputy Sheriff Roberts and
waited in a fruit stand about 19 feet south of said intersection on the southwest corner: that said car was near
the fruit stand: that ~\rthur ~filler's home, where the
burglary was committed, was west from said intersection about 150 yards. ( Tr. p. -!5). The pertinent testimony
of Deputy Sheriff Reed Oviatt reads as follows: (Tr.
p. 58)
"I stepped hack in the fruit stand to watch
for the burglar, (Tr. p. 58) and ~Ir. Roberts all(}
I had been back there a minute or two and I saw
a fellow come up the sidewalk, up Lagoon Lane
u"'**on the opposite side of the lane from me
*****in a northeasterly direction * * * he was
coming up the lane. He had his arms full of
things*****. Instead of coming over to the car,
he walked right to the corner and then turnefl
north. *****I proceeded to overtake him. I caught
up with him there, right in front of E~mma l\Iiller*****225 feet north from the fruit stand
*****.He dropped some things he had in his arms
and instantaneously turned arouncl.*****He told
me he had a shot gun and ordered me to stop,
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and not move. Then he hacked around me; and I
had my flashlight in my hand. He asked what I
had and I told him. He said, 'Drop it,' and I
dropped that. He backed around me. Backed toward the sidewalk and started hack down the
sidewalk.'' ( Tr. p. 60)
Said Reed Oviatt further testified that there was a
light on both corners; that he could see his facial features but could not tell the color of his eyes. (Tr. p. 61).
That when he reached a point about 90 feet south on the
sidewalk he shot at him and that he ran and got into the
mentioned parked ear and drove away.
:Mr. Oviatt identified the defendant In the courtroom as the person he saw on the above mentioned occasion. (Tr. p. 61).
The above mentioned scene, on cross examination
of 1Ir. Oviatt, was acted in the court room; defense counsel :Mr. 1fcCarty taking the part of the Deputy Sheriff,
and 1fr. Oviatt taking the part of the criminal. (Tr. p.
77).
On re-direct examination 1Ir. Oviatt identified the
car which appelant drove to the court room as the same
car he examined on the night of November 30th, and the
same car that appellant got into when fleeing from the
scene of the "stick-up".
Appellant's counsel in his brief advances considerable persuasion to the effect that appellant is not the
guilty person; that his identity could not he certain under
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the circumstances. His argument treats wholly ot' the
weight of the evidence. It is a good jury argument; but
for this court which is concerned only with the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence, his argument we belie\e partakes of little force against the overwhelming
endence above related.
""..,..e believe the evidence so conclusively passes the
tf'st of sufficient evidence that it is unnecessary to cite
authority in support of our contention.

III.
Appellant next claims "That the Trial Court erred
in holding that the burden of proof shifted to the defendant when he presented his alibi.''
First, we have endeavored to find where such a
claim, if it represents the trial court's position, goes to
prejudice the substantial rights of the appellant; and
second we fail to find in the court's comments on alibi,
where it found erroneously.
The trial court in its "memorandum decision" with
respect to alibi states as follows: (Tr. p. 17)
"The court can not say that the defendant
has by that alibi offered sufficient proof to establish a reasonable doubt that he was not at
Farmington at the time of the burglary, as
against the other testimony in the case, established hy direct and circumstantial evidence in
the case.
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"In the case of State v. Vanek, 84 Pac. (2nd) 567,
the Idaho Supre1ne Court held:
(6, 7) "Where a defendant relies upon the defense of alibi, the burden of et:ltablishing such defense is upon him, and if he succeeds, by competent evidence, in establishing a reat:l<mahle doubt
in the minds of the jury, as to his presence at the
time and place when and where the offense wm;
committed, when the committing of the offen~e
by him made his presence imperative, he is entitled to an acquittal, but the character and extent of the evidence requisite to create such doubt
is a matter for the jury.''
''In reaching the decision the Court holds the
defendant, under the case recited above, failed to
prove hit5 alibi by competent evidence, sufficient
to create doubt in the mind of the Court.
''The court is, therefore, of the opinion that
the motion for a new trial should be denied, aiHl
such is the Order of the Court.''
The law in Utah, prior to the adoption of the new
code of criminal procedure in 1935, allowed the defendant to raise a defense of alibi at any time without notire
to the State. The State would in many cases be taken by
surprise and not have an opportunity to properly meet
said defense. rrhe result was in many cases just prosecution circumvented.
Judicial decisions recognize this for Commonwealth v. Stine, 158 Atl. 602 (Penn.) at page 602 says:
''But in every case where the defense of ali hi
is made it should be very closely scrutinized for
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the reason so forcibly expressed by an emint>nt
judge. It is a defense often attempted by eontrivance, subordination, or perjury, nnd the proof
therefore offered to sustain it is to be subjeeh~d
to a ri(l"id
scrutinY.
0
• , because, without attemptin~
to contest or rebut the evidence of facts sustaining the charge, it attempts to prove affirmatively
another fact whollY inconsistent with it, and this
defense is equally. available if satisfaetorily established to avoid the force of positive as of circumstantial evidence.''
The Laws of Utah, 1935, Chapter 120, Section 1, on
page 231, reads as follows:
'' "nenever a defendant shall propose to offer in his defense evidence to establish an alibi on
behalf of the defendant, such defendant shall at
the time of the arraignment or within ten days
thereafter, but not less than four days before the
trial of such cause, file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney in such cause, notice in writing of
his intention to claim such defense, and in case of
a claimed alibi, such notice shall include specific
information as to the place at which the accused
claims to have been at the time of the alleged
offense.
''If the Defendant fails to file such notice he
shall not be entitled to introduce evidence tending to establish an alibi. The court may, however,
permit such evidence to be introduced where good
cause for the failure to file the notice has been
made to appear.''
It is apparent that the 1935 Legislature, through the

last quoted section, recognized the principle announced
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in the Stine case which sought to prevent escape of justice through the defense of alibi. It appears that the Legislature intended the defense of alibi to be raised as an
affirmative defense, and to require the defendant to go
further and appraise the state in advance where he
claims he was at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. Under such a legislative provision, it surely
could not fall on the State the responsibility to prove defendant was not at said certain place before he established proof that he was at said place. It seems very plain
that it is the duty of the defense to go forward and establish his affirmative defense of alibi.
The Trial Court's holding strikes at the question of
guilt or innocence. It does not mean that the defendant,
by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, has to establish
his innocence. It simply means that if he can succeed
through his defense of alibi in establishing a doubt of his
guilt in the minds of the jury then he deserves an acquittal.
In other words, assume the minds of the jury reflect
the guilt of the defendant before he raises his defense of
alibi. He is clothed with an additional protection of alihi
to effect a change in the minds of the jury from that of
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of that of questionable
doubt which effects a result of innocent.
There are many jurisdictions that hold the hurden
of proving an alibi rests with the accm;;ed, ( 16 C.•J. 5:1:1)
including Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, and Iowa.
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Even if the Trial Court was in error on tlw qm~stion
of alibi, the error does not rPnch into prPjmlit•in~ t lw
substantial rights of this appt:>lant bPenuse tlw t•onrt n~
a finder of the facts found him guilty.
We submit that the Trial Court <>ommitted no error
prejudicing the substantial rights of this appellant aml
that he was also given a fair trial.
Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General.
ZELPH S. CALDER,
Asst. Attorney General.
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